How the battle came to be:

Marathon - undoubtedly one of the greatest, and most influential, battles in ancient, if not world history. Had things gone differently then there would surely have been no Thermopylae, no Salamis, no Plataea and the whole sequence of Greek and Persian history and it’s influence on world history, would have been different. Had the Persians won at Marathon, one way or another, they may not have gone on initially to attempt conquering all of Greece, but Athens would surely have become a Persian Satrap (province) with either a puppet Greek ruler or Persian governor.

How the rest of Greece, particularly the fiercely anti-tyrannical Spartans, would have reacted to that we can only imagine

Under Persian rule Athens would never have acquired its own powerful fleet thus Phoenician & Egyptian ships and Persian influence would have dominated Mediterranean & world trade.

Imagine also what effect a Persian influenced Athens would have had on the likes of Aeschylus, the founder of drama; Anaxagoras, Plato & Protagoras, the philosophers; Aristophanes, the comic dramatist; Euripides, the playwright; Herodotus, “the father of history”; Hippocrates, “the father of medicine”; Isocrates, the orator; Phidias, the great sculptor; Pindar & Sophocles, the poets; and Thucydides the historian. All these lived in, and drew inspiration from, fifth century Greek Athens.

But it is difficult to understand the reasons for, and outcome of, the battle without first looking briefly at the political, military and social history that led to it.

When Darius acceded to the throne of Persia in 522 he already had experience of the “arrogance of Greeks”. As a member of the Royal bodyguard to Cambyses II, son of Cyrus the Great, he would have been well aware of the story of the Spartan ambassador Lacrines’ visit to Sardis and his warning to Cyrus “…..leave the cities of the Ionians well alone, if not then you will answer to the people who sent me….”, prompting Cyrus to ask “Who are these Spartans?”

Darius was to have cause to ask himself “who are these Spartans?” when, in 508bc Hippias, the pro-Persian tyrant of Athens and his rumoured Persian-financed Scythian & Thracian mercenary force was defeated by a Spartan army led by Cleomenes I of Sparta. Hippias fled to Persia, reporting his woes to Darius who promptly threatened to attack Athens if they did not accept Hippias return and reinstatement; nevertheless the Athenians preferred to remain democratic despite the danger from Persia.

Then in 499bc the Ionian Greek city states revolted against Persian rule, led by Aristagoras of Miletus and his father-in-law Histiaeus, the former tyrant of Miletus who was now an advisor to Darius.

The revolt was strongly supported by Miltiades, born in the city of Athens during the tyrannical reign of Hippias’s father Pisistratus, but now living in Chersonese, the peninsula north of Troy and west of the Hellespont the land he inherited in 520bc and partly populated with Athenian settlers.

Miltiades himself was a former ally of Darius having supported Darius’s invasion of Thrace & Scythian in 516bc.

The revolt spread quickly through the whole of Ionia and Aristagoras realized that the Persian Empire would soon be sending a military expedition to reclaim their cities. As a result, he travelled to mainland Greece to gain support. Whilst Sparta declined, Athens and Eretria agreed and both sent a fleet supported by a force of hoplites, landing at Ephesus on the Ionian coast. There they joined with a force of Ionians and marched upon Sardis. Although the Greeks were unable to take the citadel, they were free to pillage the town. During the pillaging, fires set throughout the city spread out of control and burned Sardis to the ground.

It is said that when Darius heard of Sardis being burnt by the Athenians he swore vengeance upon them, and tasked a servant with reminding him three times each day of his vow. At each meal-time the servant would say “Master, remember the Athenians” - Herodotus.

Having met with some measure of success, the Greek troops were forced to return to Ephesus as Persian reinforcements approached. On their way, however, they were ambushed by the Persian army and disastrously defeated. The Athenian troops rapidly effected a retreat onto their vessels, and returned to Greece. The Ionian revolt lasted little longer and was finally crushed in 494bc with the capture of Miletus. When the Persians suppressed the revolt, Miltiades was in danger, and when the Persian fleet approached in 494 or 493, he gave up the Chersonese and fled to Athens.

After the Ionian revolt, it was clear to the Persian government that the possessions in Asia Minor could be safe only when the Greeks in the west were subjected as well. It was time for Darius to finally deal with the Greek problem.

The battle :

In 490bc Darius sent a fleet of 600 warships and a force of 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry under the command of the Mede general Datis and Artaphernes who’s city Sardis the Athenians had burnt. With the expedition also went Hippias, the former Pisistrad ruler of Athens, who the Persians intended to re-instate. There is no doubt that Hippias was in communication with certain factions within Athens who were conspiring to hand the city over to him on his return, which may explain why the Persian force was not larger, perhaps only meant as a token force to dispel any thoughts of resistance.

The Persians first landed on Euboea and burnt Eretria on 1st September 490, its inhabitants were enslaved and deported to Elam. As well as dealing a good lesson to the Eretrians this action was probably also calculated to frighten the Athenians, and if resistance was to be offered, then to draw the Athenian army some distance from Athens itself. The Persian force then sailed the short distance to the Greek mainland disembarking and camping on the plain of Marathon, probably on the 2^nd or 3^rd September.

In Athens itself the assembly was split between resisting the Persians or accepting their terms. Many, including the Pisistrad party, favoured re-instating Hippias, others, including Miltiades of  the Philiad party & Kallimachus favoured resistance. Hippias was almost certainly kept aware of, and involved with, the ensuring intrigue and debate. It was probably the assembly’s awareness of this intrigue that caused them to take the decision to advance and engage the Persians rather than to try and hold the city against siege. It would appear that Miltiades was the leading advocate of this strategy. He would have been well aware of the of the failure of the Ionian cities to defend themselves against siege by the Persians. He may already have had his own theory of how a show of force may deter the Persians from pursuing their objectives. Certainly his authority and experience of Persian tactics could not be questioned by any in the assembly.

The decision to march to meet the Persians at Marathon was probably taken on the 6^th or 7^th of September. Runners were sent to neighbouring cities calling for aid, including the famed long-distance runner Pheidippides who, on the 7^th, was sent the 150 miles to Sparta. He arrived there in just two days and addressed the Spartans, according to Herodotus,  thus; “Men of Lacedaemon, the Athenians pray you come to their assistance and not allow our most ancient Hellenic city to be reduced to servitude by the barbarians”.

The Athenian force of some 9,000 hoplites commanded by the pole march Kallimachus, arranged in it’s ten tribes each commanded by it’s own general, probably left Athens the day after Pheidippides, reaching the coast on perhaps the 9^th or 10^th. They took up position on a slope just over a mile from the Persians and overlooking their position on the plain of Marathon below. The position was well chosen; it blocked both roads south to Athens preventing the Persians from moving out without attacking. Furthermore the Persians were unlikely to give up their preferred battleground and beachhead and attack uphill. The Athenians could therefore afford to wait for their reinforcements, particularly the Spartans. They had no reason to suspect that the Spartans would not come to their aid, although they understood that the earliest that such aid would arrive would be the 13^th.

Shortly after the Athenian arrival a force of some 1,000 hoplites from the city of Plataea arrived bringing the total force to some 10,000, still outnumber 3 to 1 but the odds were improving.

In more ways than one the situation was an impasse. Whilst the Athenians waited hopefully for the arrival of the Spartans, the Persians also had an incentive to wait. Hippias encamped with the Persian army must have been pleased with the extra time to contact his agents and supporters in Athens. The longer the Athenian force and some of his principal adversaries remained at Marathon and away from the city, the longer he had to hatch a conspiracy.

The two forces therefore faced each other, content to wait for their own plans to reach fruition.

Pheidippides probably returned to the Athenian position around the 12^th bearing the news that the Spartans, who were celebrating the festival of Carnea, refused to march until after the full moon on the 15^th.

The Athenian generals were now fully aware of how long they would have to wait for the Spartans to arrive, at least six days, time that the pro-Persian alliance in Athens could make good use of.

A full council of war was now held in the Athenian camp attended, according to Herodotus, the ten generals who included Miltiades and Themistocles, and the polemarch Kallimachus. The question of who had overall command is confusing and not helped by inconsistencies from Herodotus who suggests that the generals took command daily in rotation, and that the pole march retained overall command.

The decision before them was clear however, should they continue to wait for the arrival of the Spartans or fight. Herodotus records that the decision was equally split, with 5 of the generals favouring waiting and five, including Miltiades, favouring fighting.

According to Herodotus,  Miltiades convinced Kallimachos with these words:

“With thee it rests, Kallimachos, either to bring Athens to slavery, or, by securing her freedom, to leave behind thee to all future generations a memory beyond even Harmodius and Aristogeiton. For never since the time that the Athenians became a people were they in so great a danger as now. If they bow their necks beneath the yoke of the Medes, the woes which they will have to suffer when given into the power of Hippias are already determined on; if, on the other hand, they fight and overcome, Athens may rise to be the very first city in Greece. How it comes to pass that these things are likely to happen, and how the determining of them in some sort rests with thee, I will now proceed to make clear. We generals are ten in number, and our votes are divided; half of us wish to engage, half to avoid a combat. Now, if we do not fight, I look to see a great disturbance at Athens which will shake men’s resolutions, and then I fear they will submit themselves; but if few fight the battle before any unsoundness show itself among our citizens, let the gods but give us fair play, and we are well able to overcome the enemy. On thee therefore we depend in this matter, which lies wholly in thine own power. Thou hast only to add thy vote to my side and thy country will be free, and not fee only, but the first state in Greece. Or, if thou preferest to give they vote to them who would decline the combat, then the reverse will follow.”